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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
Amici are Professors of Law at the University of New Mexico School of
Law who are concerned with the development of the state constitutional
jurisprudence and the rights of all New Mexicans. Amici have no personal stake
in the outcome of this litigation and have not been paid by a client for their
participation in this brief. A list of Amici is appended to the signature page. On
March 6, 2014, counsel for all parties were notified of the intent of Amici to file
this brief. Counsel for all parties have responded that they do not oppose the filing
of this brief.
Counsel for Amici wishes to express his deep gratitude for the hard work of
several law students at the University of New Mexico School of Law, who
deserve credit for many of the arguments made herein: Shayne Huffman, Kari
Olson, Robyn Rose, Xochitl Torres Small, and Van Snow.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT'
This Court should reject the application of the death sentence to
Robert Fry and Tim Allen for statutory and constitutional reasons. First,
H.B. 285, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009) repealed the statutory authority
governing execution of the death sentence. Without statutory authority, the
Corrections Department cannot act.
In addition, in light of the repeal of the death sentence in New
Mexico, the application of the death sentence to Mr. Fry and Mr. Allen
would violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause of the New Mexico Constitution. These clauses have been,
and should be, interpreted to provide greater protections than their federal
analogs.
Applying the New Mexico Constitution's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment, this Court should find that New Mexico's history
evidences unique "evolving standards of decency" that preclude application
of the death penalty to Mr. Fry and Mr. Allen. Similarly, the unique nature
of New Mexico's evolution regarding the death penalty would make the
1

No counsel for any party authored the brief in whole or in part nor did any counsel or a
party make a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
this brief.
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imposition of the death penalty in these cases "unusual" in violation of the
prohibition on such punishments.
An alternative basis for precluding the use of the death sentence is the
Equal Protection Clause of the New Mexico Constitution, which has been
interpreted broadly by this Court. The Court should strictly scrutinize the
classification at issue in these cases because it infringes upon the
fundamental right to life protected by the Inherent Rights Clause of Article
II, Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution.
For these reasons, the Court should find that the imposition of the
death sentence to Mr. Fry and Mr. Allen is unlawful.
ARGUMENT
I.

H.B. 285's REPEAL OF THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
GOVERNING DEATH SENTENCE PROCEDURES
PRECLUDES THE USE OF THE DEATH SENTENCE IN THIS
CASE.
In 2009, the New Mexico Legislature passed, and Governor

Richardson signed, H.B. 285, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009) available at
http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/09%20Regular/final/HB0285.pdf. H.B.
285 repealed the death sentence for crimes committed after July I, 2009.
While noting that the modified sentencing did not apply to individuals who
committed capital crimes before July 1, 2009, H.B. 285 also independently
repealed other statutory provisions within the criminal code that governed

the procedures for executing the death sentence. H.B. 285, § 5. Because of
this repeal, no procedures governing the execution of a death sentence exist
in the New Mexico statutory code. As a result, no statutorily prescribed
death penalty procedures exist to execute Robert Fry or Tim Allen. 2 The
absence of such procedures poses a substantial risk of undue infliction of
pain or lingering death, in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
clauses of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article II,
Section 13 of the New Mexico Constitution.
The New Mexico Legislature, through H.B. 285, abolished the death
penalty by amending NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-14 (1993, amended 2009)
and substituting either a sentence of life or life without possibility of release
or parole for a death sentence. H.B. 285 also amended NMSA 1978, Section
31-20A-2 (1979, amended 2009) to remove the subsection concerning a
jury's determination of a life or death sentence and provided that upon a
finding by the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more aggravating
circumstances exist, the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment
without possibility of release or parole. Id. citing NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-5
(1981). NMSA 1978, Section 31-21-10 (2007, amended 2009) was also
amended to add a subsection stating that an inmate sentenced to life
2

This brief is being submitted in the cases of Fry v. Lopez, No. 34,372, and Allen v.
Le Master, No. 34,386. The substance of this brief is identical in each case.
-3 -

imprisonment without possibility of release or parole is not eligible for
parole and shall remain incarcerated for life.
In addition, H.B. 285 repealed the sections relating to capital felony
sentencing, capital felony cases heard by jury, and the execution of the death
sentence. NMSA 1978,§§ 3 1- 14-1 to - 16 (repealed 2009), § 3 1- 18- 14.1
(repealed 2009),§§ 3 1-20A-2.l to -4 (repealed 2009), and§ 3 1-20A-6
(repealed 2009). In particular, H.B. 285 repealed NMSA 1978, Section 3 1. 14-1 1 (repealed 2009) (Punishment of death; how inflicted), which set forth
how lethal injection should be administered.
Thus, a careful reading of H.B. 285 demonstrates that the Legislature
did four things: 1) in Sections 1-4, it amended the current laws codifying the
treatment of capital felons, meaning that individuals who committed crimes
on or after July 1, 2009 would no longer be potentially subject to the death
sentence, but instead may be subject to life without parole; 2) in Section 5 it
separately repealed statutory procedures to follow when implementing the
death penalty; 3) in Section 6 it made clear that the provisions of the bill,
meaning the amendments in Sections 1-4, applied only to crimes committed
on or after July I , 2009; and 4) it set an effective date for the law of July 1,
2009. On that date, the statutes set forth in Section 5 of the bill, which
included the procedures for implementing the death sentence, were repealed
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and taken out of the New Mexico statutory code. Those statutes are no
longer on the books in New Mexico. As a result, no statutes codifying the
procedures to implement the death penalty exist, even for individuals who
committed capital crimes prior to July 1, 2009.
A plain reading of the statute, which should be the first step in every
statutory analysis, confirms this. See State v. Jonathan M., 1990-NMSC046, ,r 4, 109 N.M. 789 ("When a statute contains language which is clear
and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from
further statutory interpretation."). However, this reading of the statute is also
confirmed by one of the few pieces of legislative history we have on this
law, set forth in the Legislative Finance Committee's H.B. 285 Fiscal Impact
Report, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009) at 3, available at
http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/09%20Regular/firs/HB0285. pdf
(hereinafter "Fiscal Impact Report"). Therein, the Legislative Finance
Committee, when submitting comments about "Technical Issues" within
H.B. 285, noted that the procedural provisions would be repealed despite the
fact that people are sitting on death row.
There may be concern that the provisions for carrying out the death
penalty, Sections 31-14-1 through 31-14-16 NMSA 1978, are repealed
in the Act, despite the fact that there are currently inmates on death
row.

-5-

Fiscal Impact Report, at 3 . Despite that clearly articulated concern, the
Legislature passed the bill with the repeal provisions in it. On July 1, 2009,
the procedures in place for executing the death sentence were repealed and
removed from the New Mexico statutory code.
If any procedures remain in existence for executing the death
sentence, they lie solely within the policies of the New Mexico Corrections
Department, and those policies are set forth without any guiding intelligible
principle articulated by the New Mexico Legislature. Indeed, Penitentiary of
New Mexico Policy 050400 (Revised April 5, 20 12), explicitly indicates that
the statutory authority for the policy has been repealed. Id., Section I, B.
Without statutory authority, the Corrections Department cannot act.
The Legislature can delegate legislative powers to administrative
agencies but in so doing, boundaries of authority must be defined and
followed. In New Mexico, action taken by a governmental agency
must conform to some statutory standard, or intelligible principle.
Rivas v. Bd. of Cosmetologists, 1984-NMSC-076, ,r 3, 10 1 N.M. 592
(internal citations omitted). To act without statutory guidance, the
Corrections Department would be in violation of Article III, Section 1 of the
New Mexico Constitution, which distributes power among the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of the state.
Setting aside the separation of powers violation, even if the
Corrections Department attempted to execute a death sentence in the
-6-

absence of statutorily-prescribed procedures, doing so would pose a
substantial risk of undue infliction of pain or lingering death, constituting
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the state and federal
constitutions. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 49 (2008) ("Punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death . . . .") (quoting In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994) ("the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the
Eighth Amendment").
Given that questions have arisen in other states and in federal cases
about the constitutionality of drug protocols during the use of lethal injection
when the protocols are prescribed by statute, proceeding in the absence of
statutory guidelines is particularly troubling. Contrast the situation in New
Mexico with that in Kentucky, the latter of which was addressed in Baze,
553 U.S. 35. There, a person on death row challenged Kentucky's use of
lethal injection by a three-drug protocol under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. In challenging Kentucky's detailed procedures, the
inmate alleged that the procedures left open the possibility of severe pain
and lingering death. Chief Justice Roberts's plurality opinion3 explained the

3

Because of the divide in the Supreme Court on the proper standard of review, Chief
Justice Robert's plurality opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, is the
controlling opinion. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas concurred and believed that the

contours of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in the context of the
challenge to Kentucky's scheme:
Our cases recognize that subjecting individuals to a risk of future
harm-not simply actually inflicting pain-can qualify as cruel and
unusual punishment. To establish that such exposure violates the
Eighth Amendment, however, the conditions presenting the risk must
be "sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,"
and give rise to "sufficiently imminent dangers." We have explained
that to prevail on such a claim there must be a "substantial risk of
serious harm," an "objectively intolerable risk of harm" that preyents
prison officials from pleading that they were "subjectively blameless
for purposes of the Eighth Amendment."
Baze, 553 U.S. at 49-50 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Helling
v. McKinney. 509 U.S. 25, 33, 34-35 (1993) (emphasis added by the Court)
and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 842, 846, & n.9 (1994)).
The plurality then noted that in Baze it was "uncontested that failing a
proper dose of sodium thiopental to render the prisoner unconscious, there is
a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation from the
administration of pancuronium bromide and of pain from potassium
chloride." Baze, 553 U.S. at 53. However, a majority (under separate
standards in various concurring opinions) of the Court found that
Kentucky's elaborate written procedural standards and specific personnel
training sufficiently ensured that the lethal injection procedure did not

standard employed was unnecessary. The four other members of the Court would require
application of a higher standard than the Roberts' s plurality.
-8-

amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. Baze, 553 U.S. at 62-63, 87, 94. The statutorily
prescribed procedures in Baze overcame the concerns that the three-drug
protocol might be used.in a way that would cause substantial risk of severe
pain or lingering death. Id. at 62.
In New Mexico, however, there are currently no statutory procedures
governing the implementation of the death sentence. Because of this void,
the Corrections Department's execution ofMr. Fry and Mr. Allen would
pose the exact risk articulated by the Court in Baze, under both the
plurality's standard and the more scrutinizing standards articulated by other
members of the Court. The procedures in-place that protected Kentucky's
use of lethal injection against an Eighth Amendment challenge do not exist
in New Mexico in either its statutory code or its administrative code. The
use of the death sentence in New Mexico would therefore pose a substantial
risk of severe pain or lingering death in violation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment and its state constitutional
analog.
Allowing the execution of death row inmates without statutory
guidance from the Legislature risks inhumane administration and prolonged
suffering, as seen in the recent execution of Dennis McGuire by the State of
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Ohio. On January 16, 2014, the State of Ohio executed Dennis McGuire
using a new and untried lethal-injection cocktail involving midazolam, a
sedative, and hydromorphone, a morphine derivative, despite arguments that
the new method would cause air suffocation and extreme agony. Robert
Higgs, State executes murderer Dennis McGuire, marking first use of new
blend of drugs for lethal injection, The Plain Dealer (Jan. 17, 2014, 7:29
AM), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2014/01/state_executes_
murderer dennis.html. Ohio announced its intention to use a new cocktail of
drugs in response to the shortage of pentobarbital, the drug formerly used for
lethal injection. Id.
McGuire was injected with the experimental cocktail at 10:29 AM.
Id. About four minutes later, McGuire started struggling and gasping loudly
for air, making snorting and choking sounds. His chest heaved and his left
fist clinched as deep, snorting sounds emanated from his mouth. Id. This
execution lasted for approximately 24 minutes and was one of the longest
executions in Ohio history. Id.
Ohi�'s agonizing human experiment was immediately front and center
in national news, leading to pleas for a moratorium on lethal injection until a
humane administration method is available. Rick Lyman, Ohio Execution
Using Untested Drug Cocktail Renews the Debate Over Lethal Injections,

- 1, /'\
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The New York Times (Jan. 1 6, 201 4), http://www.nytimes.com/201 4/0 1 / l 7/
us/ohio-execution-using-untested-drug-cocktail-renews-the-debate-over
lethal-injections.html? _r=O. McGuire's "botched execution" put Ohio's
death penalty procedures under national scrutiny and has fueled the debate
over whether lethal injection is even a constitutional method of executing
individuals. Ohio chose to use an experimental "cocktail of drugs" when
pentobarbital, the drug formerly used for lethal injection, was no longer
available due in large part to the refusal of European pharmacies to supply
United States prisons with the drug for the purpose of executing human
beings. Higgs, State executes murderer Dennis McGuire, marking first use
of new blend of drugs for lethal injection, The Plain Dealer (Jan. 1 7, 20 1 4,
7:29 AM); Alan Johnson, Inmate's death called 'horrific' under new, 2-drug
execution, The Columbus Dispatch (January 1 7, 20 1 4, 1 0:02 AM)
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/20 1 4/0 l / 1 6/
mcguire-execution.html. States that have either run out of pentobarbital or
whose current supply of pentobarbital is expired are now forced to
experiment with "alternative cocktails" like that used in the Ohio execution
or to obtain non-FDA approved drugs from unregulated compound
pharmacies. John Caniglia, Dennis McGuire's execution raises question in
debate over death penalty: Why is it so hard to put a person to death
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humanely?, The Plain Dealer (Jan. 27, 20 14, 7:06 AM),
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/0 l /mcguires_execution_
raises_key.html; Charlotte Alter, Oklahoma Convict who Felt "Body
Burning" Executed with Controversial Drug. Time Mag. (Jan. 10, 20 14),
http://nation.time.com/20 14/0 1/10/oklahoma-convict-who-felt-body
burning-executed-with-controversial-drug/; Graham Lee Brewer, Oklahoma
attorney general brief says Oklahoma does not have drugs needed for
Thursday execution, The Oklahoman (March 17, 20 14, 8 :52 PM),
http ://newsok.com/ag-brief-says-oklahoma-does-not-have-drugs-needed-for
thursday-execution/ article/39442 19. 4 Either solution opens the door to
agonizing pain and suffering between administration of the drugs and
eventual death, in clear violation of the Eighth Amendment. 5 Many states
4 For information on the lack of FDA regulation of compounding drugs, see
Compounding and the FDA: Questions and Answers, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, http://www.fda. gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory Information/
PharmacyCompounding/ucm339764.htm (last visited March 20, 2014) ("Compounded
drugs are not FDA-approved. This means that FDA does not verify the safety, or
effectiveness of compounded drugs."). See also Drug Quality and Security Act of 20 1 3,
Pub. L. No. 1 1 3-54, title I, Nov. 27, 201 3, 1 27 Stat. 587.
For a discussion on varying state approaches to lethal injection due to drug
shortages, see Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state
lethal-injection (last visited March 22, 20 1 4).
5

Tim Talley, Okla. Pharmacy Won't Give Drug for Mo. Execution,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/okla-pharmacy-responds-mo-execution-drug-suit (February
1 7, 20 1 4, 1 0:20 PM). Death row inmate Michael Taylor filed a lawsuit claiming drugs
from compound pharmacy would cause undue pain, after Missouri allegedly turned to an
Oklahoma pharmacy to supply compounded pentobarbital. The drug's only licensed
manufacturer refused to provide the drug for lethal injection. Twenty seconds into
- 1 2-

with death penalty statutes currently in place are now reconsidering lethal
injection as a preferred method of execution and are instead considering a
return to a firing squad or the electric chair. Jim Salter, States mull return of
firing squads, electric chairs, The Washington Times (Jan. 28, 20 14),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/20l4/jan/28/states-considerreviving-o1 d-fashioned-executions/?page=all.
Without statutory authority, the Corrections Department cannot
execute Mr. Fry and Mr. Allen. Even if it attempted to do so, the risk of a
"botched execution" would undoubtedly result in a procedure that was
constitutionally infirm. For these reasons, the Court should declare the death
sentence unlawful as applied to Mr. Fry and Mr. Allen.

II.

THIS COURT MAY INTERPRET THE NEW MEXICO
CONSTITUTION'S CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
CLAUSE AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
INDEPENDENTLY FOR ANY PRINCIPLED REASON.
Mr. Fry's and Mr. Allen's cases raise questions under the Cruel and

Unusual Punishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the New
Mexico Constitution. These claims can be addressed by this Court
independently of any federal court analysis and without resort to the
Michael Lee Wilson's execution in Oklahoma, Wilson stated as his final words, "I feel
my whole body burning;'' Wilson was executed using a cocktail of drugs that included
pentobarbital from a compounding pharmacy. Lyman, Ohio Execution Using Untested
Drug Cocktail Renews the Debate Over Lethal Injections, The New York Times (Jan. 1 6,
20 1 4).
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interstitial approach. As a preliminary matter, it is worth examining the
scope of this Court's interstitial approach that, by its own admission, has not
always been applied consistently. State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ,r 38,
149 N.M. 435. This examination will demonstrate that it is not always
necessary for the Court to grapple with the three-prong factors oft-cited from
State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 122 N.M. 77, in cases that raise a state
constitutional provision with a federal analog. See Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009,

,r 49. Instead, as this Court explained in State v. Leyva, when a state
constitutional provision has previously been interpreted in a way that
provides broader protections than the federal counterpart, it need only find
some principled basis for relying solely on the state constitution as an
independent source. Id. ,r 40 ("Assertion of the legal principle and
development of the facts are generally the only requirement to assert a claim
on appeal." (quoting Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ,r 22)). · Because it has
previously interpreted the state constitution's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause and Equal Protection Clause to provide broader protection than the
federal counterparts, this Court, in this case, need only find some principled
basis for relying solely on the state constitution. Relying on principled
reasons for departure ensures that the fundamental reasons for using the
interstitial approach remain protected.

t A
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The starting point for the Court's interstitial analysis is Gomez, 1 997NMSC-006, 1 22 N.M. 777. In Gomez, this Court considered various
interpretive approaches to state constitutional law: primacy, interstitial and
lockstep. Id. ,r 1 8. The primacy approach would have required that New
Mexico courts, when confronted with a state constitutional question, would
first decide the matter independently under the state constitution, and resort

only to federal law as a secondary matter. Id. The lockstep approach, also
discussed by this Court in Gomez, is the analytical opposite of the primacy
approach and requires strict adherence to federal constitutional
interpretation, with no state independent interpretation of constitutional
provisions. Id. ,r 1 6. This Court chose the interstitial approach. The Court
adopted the interstitial approach in part to avoid an "inefficient route to an
inevitable result[,]" where the federal constitution would provide the same
protection. Id. ,r 2 1 (internal quotation omitted). The interstitial approach
acknowledges "[ o]ur national judicial history and traditions closely wed
federal and state constitutional doctrine[,]" id., quoting State v. Hunt, 9 1 N.J.
338, 362 ( 1 982) (Handler, J., concurring), but that there are principled
reasons for interpreting the state constitution differently.
Under the interstitial approach, courts generally analyze the state
constitutional issue only after deciding that federal law does not determine

1 {'
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the result. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 1 19-20. This interstitial methodology
originally developed in the context of motions to suppress under Article II,
Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, 1
19- 20, and a broad, deep body of precedent has confirmed the effectiveness
of this analytic method in those cases. E.&, State v. Ketelson, 20 1 1-NMSC023, 1 20, 150 N.M. 137; State v. Rivera, 20 10-NMSC-046, 1 22, 148 N.M.
659.
Outside the search and seizure context, the interstitial analysis has
been used to interpret other parallel provisions of the state and federal
constitutions. This Court has applied it to the portion of Article II, Section
18 that was added by the Equal Rights Amendment. See New Mexico Right
to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, 1 28, 126 N.M. 788 (filed
1998). It also been used to interpret a diverse range of clauses of the New
Mexico Constitution. See State v. Lopez, 20 13-NMSC-047, 1 13
(interstitial approach applied to Confrontation Clause); Montoya v. Ulibarri,
2007-NMSC-035, 1 19-24, 142 N.M. 89 (Due Process and Cruel and
Unusual Punishment); State v. Woodruff, 1997-NMSC-06 1, 1 25, 124 N.M.
388 (right to counsel/Due Process); and State v. Rueda, 1999-NMCA-033,
1 1 1, 126 N.M. 738 (Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause).

1,
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When confronting a state constitutional provision for the first time,
the interstitial approach involves a multi-step analysis. First, does the United
States Constitution protect the right in question? Second, was the state
constitutional claim preserved? Third, is divergence from the federal
constitution appropriate for some principled reason, such as flawed federal
precedent, structural differences between the state and federal government,
or distinctive state characteristics? Leyva, 20 l l -NMSC-009, ,r 49; Michael
B. Browde, Gomez Redux: Procedural and Substantive Developments
Twelve Years On, 40 N.M. L. Rev. 179, 187 n.65 (2010).
In State v. Leyva, this Court made clear that it had not always
consistently applied the proper framework within the interstitial approach.
201 l -NMSC-2009, ,r 38. It went on to explain that the last prong need not be
examined if the Court has previously interpreted a state constitutional
provision to provide broader protection that the federal counterpart.
We agree that the proper inquiry under Gomez is whether the
provision of the state constitution has previously been construed to
provide broader protection than its federal counterpart, and disavow
any prior statements to the contrary.
Id. ,r 48.
This statement in Leyva explains why, in several cases, this Court has
not discussed the interstitial approach or why it chose to depart from federal
precedent. For example, recently in Griego v. Oliver, this Court did not walk
- l 7-

through the reasons to depart from federal Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence. 20 1 4-NMSC-003, 1 68 (filed 20 1 3). It did not need to do so,
because the state constitution's Equal Protection Clause had previously been
interpreted more broadly in Breen v. Carlsbad, 2005-NMSC-028,1 27, 1 38
N.M. 33 1 .
The interstitial approach is not unharnessed, however. In Leyva, the
Court emphasized that not being restricted by the Gomez factors in cases
where the provision has already been interpreted more broadly does not
mean that it has moved to the primacy approach altogether.
The fact that we have departed from the analysis used to determine
whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred in certain
contexts, however, does not require us to do so in all contexts. It
remains necessary to conduct our de novo review of the law, as "this
Court has demonstrated a willingness to undertake independent
analysis of our state constitutional guarantees when federal law begins
to encroach on the sanctity of those guarantees."
Leyva, 20 1 1 -NMSC-009, 1 5 1 (quoting State v. Gutierrez, 1 993-NMSC062, 1 32, 1 1 6 N.M. 43 1 ). That there must remain a principled reason for
interpreting the state constitution differently than its federal counterpart
protects the reasons this Court chose the interstitial approach over the
primacy approach initially. This Court, at least in a situation where it is
addressing a constitutional provision previously interpreted to provide

10
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greater protections, must still conduct a de novo review of the law and find a
principled reason for departing from federal jurisprudence.
In this case, Mr. Fry and Mr. Allen rely primarily upon two state
constitutional provisions to argue that the death penalty is unconstitutional
as applied to them: the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause. 6 Both of these provisions have previously been
interpreted by this Court to provide broader protections than their federal
counterparts. Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035, ,r 24, 142 N.M. 89
(holding that the New Mexico Constitution requires that a habeas petitioner
must be allowed to plead innocence in a habeas petition in order to satisfy
\

the New Mexico Constitution's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); see
also State v. Rueda, 1999-NMCA-033, 4'f4'f 12-13, 126 N.M. 738 (holding
that a sentence violated Article II Section 13 of the New Mexico
Constitution even though the United States Supreme Court was unable to
agree on a proportionality review in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957
(1991)); Breen v. Carlsbad, 2005-NMSC-028, 138 N.M. 331 (interpreting
state Equal Protection Clause more broadly than its federal analog).
Accordingly, this Court need not undertake the mechanical
application of the Gomez factors to interpret the New Mexico Constitution's
6

Mr. Fry and Mr. Allen also rely on the New Mexico Constitution's ban on Special
Laws, which is outside the focus of this brief.
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Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause or its Equal Protection Clause
independently. Instead, it need only find some other principled basis for
interpreting the state constitutional provisions independently in this context.
And, as set forth below, substantial principled reasons exist for doing so.
III.

THE COURT SHOULD INTERPRET THE NEW MEXICO
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSE TO
PRECLUDE THE DEATH PENALTY IN THIS CASE.
A. There is no federal precedent on point.
The issue before this Court - the constitutionality of the application of

the death penalty to two persons on death row after repeal of the prospective
application of the death penalty - has never been decided by the United
States Supreme Court or any federal court. Accordingly, the absence of
federal precedent should compel this Court to decide the issue under the
state constitution. In cases where the scope of the federal right is unclear, the
interstitial approach permits the state court to proceed to the state
constitutional claim. State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, 1 25, 147 N.M. 134
(reaching the state constitutional question where there was "serious
uncertainty" about the federal law issue).
B. Federalism concerns are not present.
There exists a structural difference in the relationship between the
state government and its citizens that differs greatly from that of the federal
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government. Whereas the federal government represents the entire nation,
the New Mexico government represents New Mexicans. The absence of
federalism concerns under our state constitution has already been recognized
as a structural difference that supports reading the New Mexico Constitution
more broadly than its federal counterpart. In Montoya v. Ulibarri, this Court
accepted that a freestanding actual innocence claim may support a state
habeas corpus challenge despite conflicting precedent from the United States
Supreme Court. 2007-NMSC-035, 1 19. The United States Supreme Court
decision to deny the habeas petition "was informed by concerns of
federalism," id. 1 20, and those "principles of federalism" did not impose the
same constraints on this Court. Id. 1 2 1.
The absence of a federalism constraint liberates this Court to diverge
from the restrictive federal reading of constitutional provisions. See Michael
B. Browde, State v. Gomez and the Continuing Constitutional Conversation
Over New Mexico's State Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence, 28 N.M. L.
Rev. 387, 406 n. 1 12 ( I 998) (recognizing reduced federalism concerns as one
reason to read the state constitution more broadly). Consequently, the
meaning of cruel and unusual punishment in New Mexico should be based
on a New Mexican consensus.

C. New Mexico has unique history reflecting our state's "evolving
standards of decency."

This Court, in assessing proportionality review of a death sentence
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, has considered state laws,
"public attitudes concerning a particular sentence and . . . its history,
precedent, legislative attitudes and the responses of the jurors." State v.
Garcia, 1 983-NMSC-008, , 35, 99 N.M. 77 1 . The unique history of the use
of the death sentence in New Mexico illuminates how the "standards of
decency" have evolved. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 1 53, 1 74 ( 1976) (cruel
and unusual punishment is determined by assessing "evolving standards of
decency").
Certainly, the exceedingly rare use of the death penalty renders it
"uncommon" in New Mexico. Notably, the "last involuntary or forcible
execution in New Mexico was in 1 960." Marcia J. Wilson, The Application
of the Death Penalty in New Mexico, July 1 979 Through December 2007:
An Empirical Analysis, 38 N.M. L. Rev. 255, 272 (2008). In its comment
on H.B. 285, the Legislative Finance Committee noted that there was only a
4.5% chance that a death penalty prosecution would ever end in an execution
in New Mexico. Fiscal Impact Report, at 3.
From 1 979 (when the death penalty was reinstated) to 2007, there
have been 2 1 1 capital crime cases. Of those cases, 43. 1 % were filed in the

first decade after the' death penalty was reinstated ( 1980-1989). In total,
juries have sentenced fifteen people to death (Terry Clark twice). Twelve of
those sentences were later overturned or set aside: five were commuted by
Governor Toney Anaya, five were reversed on direct appeal, two were
reversed during post-conviction proceedings, and one individual died of
natural causes. Wilson, 38 N.M. L. Rev. at 270-27 1. The only execution
since 1960 was on November 6, 200 1, after Terry Clark voluntarily
abandoned his habeas claims. Id. at 27 1.
Since the reinstatement of the death penalty, New Mexico juries
sentenced 9.9% of individuals in capital cases to death in the first decade
and only 7.7% in the second decade. Robert Fry is the only person sentenced
to death in New Mexico in this century. See id. at 298 (showing that only
one person received a death sentence from 2000-2007). Since the 2009
repeal of the death sentence, no jury has sentenced an individual to death for
a crime committed prior to July 1, 2009. In 20 12, a New Mexico jury did
not decide to sentence Michael Astorga to death, and the judge then
sentenced him to life (life without parole was unavailable). Olivier
Uyttebrouck, Life in Prison, Albuquerque J. (May 19, 20 12),
http://www.abqjoumal.com/ 107698/news/life-in-prison.html. In federal
court, New Mexico juries did not decide on death sentences for Larry Lujan
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in 2011 and John McCluskey in 2013, both of whom were then sentenced to
life in prison. Ashley Meeks, Lujan Dodges Death Penalty. Las Cruces Sun
News (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.lcsun-news.com/las_cruces
news/ci_ l905 l 796; Press Release, United States Department of Justice,
John Charles McCluskey to Receive Life Prison Sentence for Murdering
Oklahoma Couple (Dec. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/ December/l 3-crm-1305.html.
In New Mexico, attitudes and values of many citizens concerning the
death penalty are informed by Roman Catholicism, the religion practiced by
a majority of the population. The Roman Catholic Church opposes use of the
death penalty. See United States Conference on Catholic Bishops, The
Church's Anti-Death Penalty Position, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and
action/human-life-and-dignity/death-penalty-capital-punishment/catholic
campaign-to-end-the-use-of-the-death-penalty.cfm (last visited Mar. 12,
2014). When evaluating "evolving standards of decency" that depend upon
an assessment of public attitudes, taking into account the religious attitudes
that inform such an assessment is appropriate, particularly because of the
practical ramifications of the religious influence. In its Fiscal Impact Report,
the Legislative Finance Committee emphasized that one reason why jury
selection in capital cases was so arduous and costly in New Mexico was
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because the issue "potentially touches the . . . religious rights of New
Mexicans[.]" Fiscal Impact Rep,ort, at 2. In signing H.B. 285, then-Governor
Richardson noted that his decision was influenced by "the archbishop and
the Catholic Church, because they are very, very influential in a Catholic
state like New Mexico." Cindy Wooden, State's Decision to Abolish Death
Penalty Marked at Rome's Colosseum, Catholic News Service (Apr. 15,
2009), http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0901704.htm.
All of this evidence demonstrates that the view of the death sentence
in New Mexico has, over the last 50 years, and in particular the last 35 years,
increasingly been met with public disdain. Two Governors have acted
explicitly to avoid its imposition, the Legislature has repealed it
prospectively, juries have increasingly rejected it, and New Mexico's unique
religious culture informs the standards of decency that abhor it. For these
reasons, this Court should find that applying the death penalty to Mr. Fry
and Mr. Allen would violate notions of "fundamental fairness" enshrined in
the New Mexico Constitution. Montoya v. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035, ,I 23.
D. Applying the death sentence now, in light of the prospective
repeal, would be highly "unusual."

This Court has explicitly stated that the terms "cruel" and "unusual,"
in the context of the Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and
Article II, Section 1 3 of New Mexico Constitution, have different meanings.
-25-

State ex rel. Serna v. Hodges, 1976-NMSC-033, �� 10- 12, 89 N.M. 35 1,
overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Rondeau, 1976-NMSC-044,
89 N.M. 408. "We are unwilling to believe that the phrase simply uses two
words where one would do. Probably it would be held to preclude the
imposition of some form of punishment which was unknown to the history
of the law, or at least rare in modern times . . . " Id. (emphasis added). In
Hodges, this Court quoted Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, 408 U.S.
238 ( 1958), noting, "If the word 'unusual' is to have any meaning apart from
the word 'cruel,' however, the meaning should be the ordinary one,
signifying something different from that which is generally done." Hodges,
1976-NMSC-033, � 12 n. 17.
In State v. Clark, Terry Clark argued that his death sentence was
"unusual" because New Mexico, as of 1999, had not executed anyone since
the death penalty became effective in 1979. 1999-NMSC-035, � 60, 128
N.M. 1 19. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the meaning of
"unusual" turns on the nature of the punishment under consideration, not the
infrequency of its imposition. Id. However, the death sentence is now
"unusual" in ways that it was not in 1999.
This Court in Clark was not faced with the "unusual" situation before
it now. The Legislature has completely prohibited application of the death
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sentence for crimes committed after July 1, 2009, and repealed any
procedures regulating the execution of the sentence. This situation breathes
life into the word "unusual" in a way that mere infrequency does not. Given
that New Mexico has generally rejected the use of the death penalty
prospectively, it would be highly unusual to use it against Mr. Fry and Mr.
Allen.
For these reasons, the Court should declare that the death sentence, as
applied to Mr. Fry and Mr. Allen, violates the New Mexico Constitution's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

IV.

THE APPLICATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY HERE
WOULD VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Mr. Fry and Mr. Allen argue that imposing the death sentence on them

violates the Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. and New Mexico
Constitutions. This Court should find that the executions would violate the
state constitution's Equal Protection Clause because of New Mexico's
history of strictly scrutinizing laws that affect Inherent Rights and the state's
well-established commitment to equality.

A. The New Mexico Inherent Rights Clause should inform the
Court's application of strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.
Article II, Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution provides:
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All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent
and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and
defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting
property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness.
This Court should give full meaning to this constitutional codification of
basic human rights. The provision articulates fundamental rights that should
be used to determine the level of scrutiny a court should employ under the
state Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, New Mexico appellate courts have
already indicated that the inherent rights language is judicially enforceable.
See Griego v. Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, � 1 (filed 2013); State v. Sutton,
1991-NMCA-073, � 23, 112 N.M. 449; State v. Brooken, 1914-NMSC-075,
19 N.M. 404.
In New Mexico, when a statute is attacked on equal protection
grounds, one of three possible analyses generally is applied to determine the
statute's constitutionality: (1) rational basis scrutiny, (2) intermediate
scrutiny, or (2) strict scrutiny. Meyers v. Jones, 1988-NMSC-0 11, �� 8-10,
106 N.M. 708. "The most stringent analysis is termed 'strict scrutiny' and it
is applied when the challenged legislation affects the exercise of a
fundamental right expressly or implicitly guaranteed by the constitution
." Id.
Most recently and most notably, this Court began its unanimous
opinion in Griego v. Oliver by quoting the Inherent Rights Clause. 2014'\ O
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NMSC-003, 1 1. That the Court did so in a case that primarily turned on the
Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause illustrates how the two
clauses work together. Notably, this Court in Griego decided to employ an
intermediate level of scrutiny to the sexual orientation classification in that
case. Id. 1 53. Thus, this Court has already relied upon the Inherent Rights
Clause to inform its interpretation of the state Equal Protection Clause, one
that results in heightened scrutiny of state laws. That same approach should
guide the Court in this instance. See �, Marshall J. Ray, What Does the
Natural Rights Clause Mean to New Mexico?, 39 N.M. L. Rev. 375, 403 - 04
(2009) (discussing how the Inherent Rights Clause may be applied to inform
a due process analysis).
Such an approach, one that uses the Inherent Rights Clause to bolster
other constitutional protections, is supported by historical precedent in New
Mexico. In Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, this Court relied upon the Inherent
Rights Clause to inform its due process jurisprudence. 1997-NMSC-055,

1 I 03,

124 N.M. 129, overruled on other grounds by N.M., ex rel. Ortiz v.

Reed, 524 U.S. 15 1 ( 1998). "When extradition will directly result in the
deprivation without due process of the defendant's life, the New Mexico
Constitution requires the protection of his or her life and safety." Reed v.
State ex rel. Ortiz, 1997-NMSC-055,

,r I 03 (citing N.M. Const. art. II,§
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and§ 18). See also id.

,r 105 (holding that the extradition process was not

meant to abrogate the inherent rights within N.M. Const. art. II,§ 4). Thus,
the Inherent Rights Clause should compel this Court to strictly scrutinize
discriminatory laws that affect one of the fundamental, enumerated rights set
forth in Article II, Section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution.
"There is no right more fundamental than the right to one's own life."
Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, 1997-NMSC-055,

,r 10 1. Because application of

the death penalty to Mr. Fry and Mr. Allen implicates their fundamental
right to life, this Court should employ a heightened level of scrutiny to the
classification at issue here, that is, the one that draws the line of capital
punishment based on whether the crime was committed before or after 2009.
As this Court explained in Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, when interpreting the
Inherent Rights Clause, the Court should remember the "intimate
relationship" that exists between a state and its people, and therefore, the
individual rights that are displaced at the federal level because of federalism
concerns are entitled to greater protection by the Court. 1997-NMSC-055,

,r

105 (quoting Cal. First Bank v. State, 1990-NMSC- 106, if 44, 1 1 1 N.M. 64).
For this reason, when a law classifies individuals in a way that discriminates
against their fundamental right to life, the state Inherent Rights Clause and
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the state Equal Protection Clause should be read to require that the law be
subject to the strictest form of scrutiny.
A similar approach can be drawn from U.S. Supreme Court precedent
interpreting the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Before the
Supreme Court's development of its substantive due process jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court decided questions of "fundamental interests" under the
Equal Protection Clause. In Skinner v. State of Okla. ex rel. Williamson, for
example, the Supreme Court applied "strict scrutiny" under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to invalidate an Oklahoma law that
mandated sterilization of individuals who committed two or more crimes of
moral turpitude. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The law was constitutionally
infirm because of the discriminatory fashion in which crimes of "moral
turpitude" were defined. Id. at 541-542. In striking down the law as one that
unconstitutionally discriminated against the fundamental right to
procreation, the U.S. Supreme Court used language that is equally applicable
(if not even more applicable) to the fundamental right to life at stake in the
case at bar.
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. . . . There is no redemption for the individual
whom the law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to
his irreparable inj ury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty. We
mention these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police power
of the States. We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that
,., 1
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strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a
sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise invidious
discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in
violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws. The
guaranty of "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection
of equal laws." When the law lays an unequal hand on those who
have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and
sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as an invidious a
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for
oppressive treatment.
Id. at 54 1 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted) (citing Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 1 18 U.S. 356 ( 1886) and State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 ( 1938)). See generally. Victoria F. Nourse, In
Reckless Hands: Skinner v. Oklahoma and the Near-Triumph of American
Eugenics, (W. W. Norton & Co. 2008).
Like the law in Skinner, permitting the death penalty to apply to Mr.
Fry and Mr. Allen lays a similarly "unequal hand on those who have
committed intrinsically the same quality of offense." Indeed, the only
difference here is a temporal one. The temporal distinction is insufficient to
support a classification that must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the
classification must be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. Here,
neither the deterrent nor the retributive rationale can satisfy this rigorous test
and permit the state to execute two men solely because they committed their
crimes before July 1, 2009.

Altering Mr. Fry's and Mr. Allen's death sentences to life without
parole would not detract from the government's interest in deterrence and
retribution. In limited circumstances, the concern for deterrence and
retribution does not supersede the government's ability to alter a sentence
post-conviction. A post-conviction alteration to Fry's and Allen's sentences
will not negate the punishment for their crime, but change it to a lifetime of
punishment. The state's interests in deterrence and retribution are still fully
served by such a post-conviction alteration.
By establishing a prospective-only repeal of the death penalty, H.B.
285 created two classes of people who committed similar crimes. As noted,
because the classification treads upon the fundamental right to life, strict
scrutiny must apply. The very passage of H.B. 285, repealing the death
penalty prospectively, demonstrates that the state and the people of New
Mexico recognize a less restrictive punishment for crimes similar to those
for which Fry and Allen were convicted. Because the Legislature has
recognized that any crime that would have been death-penalty eligible is
now punishable by life without parole, the State itself has demonstrated a
less restrictive means. Accordingly, the law is not narrowly tailored and thus
fails strict scrutiny.
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B. New Mexico's history contains a distinctive commitment to
equality in all areas of law.

Throughout the history of New Mexico, its citizens and judiciary have
steadfastly defended individual liberties and the right of all people to
equality under the law. This commitment to individual rights crosses
substantive areas of law and dates back to the state's founding and probably
before. This strong, historic dedication to equal protection provides the
foundation for close scrutiny of any discriminatory provision.
New Mexico's first proposed constitution, written in 1850, firmly
rejected slavery at a time when the federal government was still debating the
desirability of that loathsome institution. Dale R. Rugge, Comment, An
Equal Protection Challenge to First Degree Depraved Mind Murder under
, the New Mexico Constitution, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 511, 532 (1989). The state
constitution, ultimately adopted in 1911, protected the equality of Spanish
speaking citizens and provided that children of Spanish descent would never
be denied the right of admission to public schools or placed in schools
separate from other children. N.M. Const. art. VII, § 3 and art. XII, § I 0.
The same constitutional provisions also provide some of the strongest
protections for minority language rights in the country. State v. Rico, 2002NMSC-022, 1 5, 132 N.M. 570 (right of juror to serve even though he
primarily spoke Navajo). More recently, New Mexico's Equal Rights
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Amendment, adopted in the early l 970s, expanded Article II, Section 1 8 of
the New Mexico Constitution to guarantee that "[e]quality of rights under
law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person." .
Consistent with this history of equal treatment, the New Mexico
Supreme Court has applied a version of rational basis review under the state
Equal Protection Clause that is often more searching than the federal
standard. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1 998-NMSC-03 1 , 1 3 1 , 1 25 N.M.
72 1 (noting that the "rational basis inquiry does not have to be largely
toothless"). It has applied heightened scrutiny more broadly than federal
law. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, 1 1 5. The culmination of this history should
be reflected in the Court's determination that a heightened level of scrutiny
applies to a classification that directly affects a fundamental right.
CONCLUSION
Because of the statutory and constitutional provisions discussed
above, Amici respectfully submit that executing Mr. Fry or Mr. Allen would
be unlawful.
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